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Abstract
Recent works in scientific realism by Stanford (2006) and Chakravartty (2008)
have generated interests in the research of a more selective and sophisticated scientific
realism. Such debates advance the philosophical development of scientific realism, and
arguably shape scientific realism toward a more refined description. Among many
scientific theories discussed by Stanford (2006) and Chakravartty (2008), we have
found their examples excluding those from engineering sciences, and this attracts our
attention. In this paper, we first give an overview of Stanford’s induction. Second,
we analyze the arguments presented by Stanford (2006) and Chakravartty (2008) in
depth to explore possible reasons why engineering sciences are seemly out of the scope
of the debates. Third, we re-examine the philosophical debates by Stanford (2006) and
Chakravartty (2008) in the context of an interesting case in mechanical engineering,
d’Alembert’s paradox, presented by Grimberg (2008). We conclude in the final section
on the validity of applying Stanford’s induction to engineering sciences.
Keyword: Realism, Antirealism, Underdetermination, Pessimistic induction, Stability,
Laboratory sciences, Engineering sciences, d’Alembert’s paradox
1 Introduction
Contemporary science has reached great practical achievements. Stanford (2006) describes
an example of a shower radio. As simple as it might seem, it would not function unless the
theories we used to build it, concerning radio waves, electricity, acoustics, and many other
technical areas, are accurate descriptions of how things function in nature. It seems fair to
say that the fundamental claims of scientific theories must be at least be roughly accurate,
under the consideration of the fact that we are sure to make some errors in the details.
This line of thinking has been embraced by not only people of good common sense, but also
professional philosophers. The accepted view is formally known as scientific realism: the
position that the central claims of our best scientific theories about how things function in
nature must be at least approximately true.
A strong support of this line of argument was first formulated by science philosopher
Hilary Putnam, claiming that ”the positive argument for realism is that it is the only
philosophy that doesn’t make the success of science a miracle.” As described by Stanford
(2006), the central idea of this “miracle argument” is that ”the only satisfactory explanation
for the success of our scientific theories is that they are (at least approximately) true in the
most straightforward sense of the term: any other view of the matter leaves it a complete
and utter miracle why our best scientific theories are so successful.” Further developments
of this line of arguments have been done by many philosophers, Popper; Smart; Boyd;
Musgrave; Leplin; Psillos; Kitcher and others. Because of its evident power and appeal, it
has been the strongest support of the realists position, as described by Stanford (2006).
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Despite the wide influence of the realism arguments, competing considerations have en-
couraged some philosophers to question the rationale for the realist position. As Stanford
(2006) describes, our generation is not the first to develop theories about the nature world.
By induction, the history of science consists of a succession of past histories that made
radically different claims compared to our own do about the fundamental constitution and
workings of nature. Numerous claims that were ultimately shown to be false, despite just
the same kinds of accomplishments as in present theories. Contemporary philosophers of
science call this argument the Pessimistic Induction (PI): ”the scientific theories of the
past have turned out to be false despite exhibiting the same impressive virtues that present
theories do, so we should expect our own successful theories to ultimately suffer the same
fate. In other words, if the history of science really consists of a succession of increasingly
successful theories making radically and fundamentally different claims about the principles
of nature, why would we suppose that this process has come to an end with the theories
of the present day?” This method of historical induction is strong, and several inductive
arguments against scientific realism have found similar roots as we will see later.
For instance, Larry Laudan has used a similar appeal to the historical record of scientific
inquiry. As described by Stanford (2006), he argues that the historical record testifies that
innumerable past scientific theories have been remarkably successful, although not true.
One wonders if our own theories will meet the same fate. This in turn shows why the
realist’s inference from the success of a scientific theory to its truth is unwarranted. Notice
that defenders of past scientific theories occupied at one time just the same position that
we do now: they thought the evident success in prediction, explanation, and intervention
afforded us by, Newtonian mechanics for example, rendered it impossible that the theory
was false. ”If Newtonian mechanics weren’t true, they might have said, then it would have
to be a miracle that the theory is so successful and offers such accurate predictions and
convincing systematic explanations concerning diverse physical phenomena ranging from
the flight of cannonballs to the orbits of the planets. But they were wrong, and Laudan
suggests that we would be equally wrong to draw the same conclusion about the successful
theories of our own day.” Notice that the example of Newtonian mechanics serves as a mo-
tivating example here, and it will also be a testing ground for many arguments in this paper.
In addition to PI, the other central consideration used to challenge the defense of sci-
entific realism is called the Underdetermination of Theories by the Evidence (UTE). ”It is
essentially concerned with the possible existence of alternatives to our best scientific theories
that share some or all of their empirical implications — that is, quite different accounts of
the entities and processes inhabiting some inaccessible domain of nature that nonetheless
make the same confirmed predictions about what we should expect to find in the world. No
matter how impressive a theory’s practical achievements in guiding prediction and inter-
vention are, those achievements do not favor the theory over any alternative that would
enjoy just the same degree of empirical successes.” And some philosophers of science have
sought to show that every scientific theory must have what they call empirical equivalents:
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alternatives sharing all and only the same empirical implications. This line of reasoning,
however, is inherently flawed as argued by Stanford (2006).
We hope the several lines of reasoning around scientific realism are now clear. As de-
scribed by Stanford (2006), ”the concerns about the truth of our best scientific theories
prompted by PI and UTE are likely to surprise many thoughtful people. How could it re-
ally be like that? Surely our best scientific theories couldn’t really be so successful in their
practical applications without being at least approximately true in their fundamental claims
about nature.” But in fact, the history of science itself provides an abundant treasure trove
of examples illustrating just what it is like for scientific theories to enjoy substantial empiri-
cal success while being profoundly mistaken in their most fundamental claims about nature.
We revisit the motivating example of Newtonian mechanics and its relation to relativity
theory. As described by Stanford (2006), ”gravity is not merely a force exerted by massive
objects on one another, but instead reflects the curvature of space-time itself. Gravitational
motion is not like two marbles being pulled toward each other by invisible strings, but is
instead like two marbles rolling from the lip to the bottom of a shallow bowl, where the bowl
represents the deformation of the fabric of space and time itself produced by the masses of
the marbles. Nonetheless, for a wide variety of purposes and in a wide variety of contexts,
it is extremely useful to think of the world as if Newtonian mechanics were true.” Indeed,
Newtonian mechanics is still the physics we use to send rockets to the moon, because it
is much simpler to work with than the contemporary alternatives and the empirical pre-
dictions. Calculations within the framework of rockets and moons turn out to be quite
accurate despite the fact that Newtonian mechanics is profoundly mistaken about the fun-
damental constitution of nature. ”Although this sometimes invites the counter-claim that
Newtonian mechanics itself is “approximately true,” this can only mean that its empirical
predictions approximate those of its successors across a wide range of contexts. It cannot
mean that it is approximately correct as a fundamental description of the physical world.
In this respect, Newtonian mechanics is just plain false. And this recognition invites us to
ask whether it might not be that all of our own scientific theories are both fundamentally
mistaken but at the same time empirically successful in just this same way?” Given a strong
link between Newtonian mechanics and engineering sciences (e.g. mechanical engineering,
civil engineering, micro engineering), we are tempted to ask whether engineering sciences
are also fundamentally mistaken and nonetheless empirically successful. This line of rea-
soning will be thoroughly discussed in the following section.
Although fundamentally appealing, PI arguments seem to have reached a stalemate in
the philosophy of science. Realists respond to the challenge of the pessimistic induction
by pointing out ways in which at least some contemporary theories are indeed distinct
from their predecessors, and they therefore reject the validity of the inductive projection
from past to present cases. In response, defenders of the pessimistic induction demand to
know why just these varieties or degrees of success are special. How should that defuse the
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proposed induction, noting the existence of earlier varieties and degrees of predictive and
explanatory success that (1) were equally thought to be explicable only by the truth of the
theories, and that (2) turned out not to be so? As a result, each side simply seems to shift
the burden onto the other, which is not altogether convincing.
UTE arguments are in a similar stalemated situation. The arguments offered on both
sides of the challenge posed to scientific realism by UTE have not generated anything re-
freshing. The problem of UTE grows out of the worry that there might be alternatives to
even our best scientific theories that would make the same predictions in the cases we have
tested, and would therefore be no less well confirmed than our own present successful theo-
ries. However, as Stanford (2006) describes, ”it is quite difficult to decide how seriously we
ought to take this frankly speculative possibility. In the absence of any evidence, why should
we either assume that such alternatives exist, or let the bare possibility that they might
exist prevent us from believing the best-confirmed theories we do have?” It seems sensible
for philosophy researchers (Kitcher, Leplin, Achinstein) to insist that any such alternatives
actually be produced before we take them seriously about the truth of the contemporary
theories.
Facing this stalemated situation, Stanford (2006) devises a new argument to combine
the strengths of PI and UTE without falling into the fallacies of both. For UTE argu-
ments, he believes these researchers have concentrated their attention and argumentative
efforts on the rather trivial forms of UTE that they can prove to obtain universally, and
in the process they have abandoned the effort to show that UTE obtained should actually
lead us to question the truth of our best scientific theories. More specifically, ”defenders
of UTE have sought to provide us with a procedure (ideally an algorithmic or mechanical
procedure) for generating empirical equivalents to any theory at all. They have sought to
articulate a procedure for generating alternatives to absolutely any theory that will have
precisely the same empirical implications as the original.” It is this strategy of trying to
defend the significance of UTE by showing that all theories have empirical equivalents that
Stanford (2006) suggests constitutes the inherent flaws for defenders of UTE, for it succeeds
only where it gives up any significant challenge to the truth of our best scientific theories.
Instead, Stanford (2006) suggests that the historical record offers plain-spoken inductive
evidence to the fact that we have repeatedly occupied a position of under-determination
across a wide variety of scientific fields. It is because we have repeatedly failed to conceive
of all the empirically inequivalent theoretical possibilities that are well confirmed by the ev-
idence available to us. Recalling that PI notes that past successful theories have turned out
to be false and suggests that we have no reason to think that present successful theories will
not meet the same fate. By contrast, Stanford (2006) proposes the new induction over the
history of science–the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA): ”we have, throughout
the history of scientific inquiry and in virtually every scientific field, repeatedly occupied an
epistemic position in which we could conceive of only one or a few theories that were well
confirmed by the available evidence, while subsequent inquiry would reveal further, radically
5
distinct alternatives as well confirmed by the previously available evidence.” One interest-
ing aspect of argument is that Stanford (2006) describes his induction as valid for virtually
every scientific field, we would examine this statement closely for engineering sciences in
the following sections.
PUA is certainly not perfect. Since the historical record offers at best evidence that we
presently occupy a significant under-determination position, rather than a kind of demon-
strative proof that advocates have traditionally sought, as admitted by Stanford (2006).
Furthermore, unlike constructing empirical equivalents, it does not allow us to say just
which actual theories are under-determined by the evidence. On the other hand, Stanford
(2006) suggested that ”the search for empirical equivalents has managed to provide con-
vincing evidence of an UTE only where it has transformed the problem into one or another
familiar philosophical puzzle. These forms of UTE simply do not threaten to bear out the
original concern that the very same evidence leading us to embrace our own scientific the-
ories might turn out to support alternative theories. Abandoning the fascination with them
in this connection seems a small price to pay for returning our attention to the kind of
UTE that the historical record suggests might pose a substantial challenge to even our most
successful scientific theories about nature. Thus, PUA concerns alternatives to our best
scientific theories, but not in the same way that the search for UTE does. Furthermore,
it draws its force and evidence of its significance from the historical record of scientific
inquiry, but not in the same way that PI does.” At its heart is neither the simple historical
revelation that even the best scientific theories of any given prior epoch have turned out to
be false, nor the concern that we might be able to generate alternative theories. Instead,
PUA concerns itself with theories that we should take seriously as competitors to our best
accounts of nature if we knew about them, but that are excluded from competition only
because we have not conceived them.
PUA has certainly generated new challenges to the realist position, but the realists are
not without counteractions. As proposed by Chakravartty (2008), ”the best response to
PUA is simply to grant PUA, or to grant that the phenomenon of unconceived alternatives
is a fact of scientific life, but to dispute Stanford’s argument that this spells the death of
realism. Of course scientists do not typically conceive of all promising alternatives to their
own theories, and today’s scientists are no exceptions. The real question of interest here is
whether there is anything like a principled continuity across scientific theories over time,
which would allow realists to claim certain aspects of theoretical descriptions as approxi-
mately true.” Indeed, this is what realists generally think: our best theories today are our
best attempts to describe the world thus far; in the meantime, we have good reason to
believe that certain aspects of today’s theories will remain true.
There are two main foci in the subsequent sections of this paper. In section 2, we
investigate the examples of engineering studies that are immune to Stanford’s induction,
and their implications on the stability of engineering sciences. We are particularly inter-
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ested in characterizing the stability of engineering sciences. In section 3, we introduce an
interesting case in mechanical engineering, the d’Alembert’s paradox, that might challenge
the conventional view on the stability of engineering sciences. In section 4, we re-examine
the philosophical debates by Chakravartty (2008) and Stanford (2006) in the context of
this paradox, and perform relevant philosophical analysis. We conclude in section 5 by
combining arguments drawn from cases that support the immunity of engineering sciences
to Stanford’s induction, and reflections from the d’Alembert’s paradox that some cases still
require more careful philosophical analysis. We hope these complementary ideas would lead
us forward in the understanding of Stanford’s induction and engineering sciences.
2 Stanford’s induction and engineering sciences
Recent works in scientific realism by Stanford (2006) and Chakravartty (2008) have gener-
ated interests in the research of a more selective and sophisticated realism. Such debates
advance the philosophical development of scientific realism, and arguably shape scientific
realism toward a more refined description. Among many scientific theories discussed by
Stanford (2006) and Chakravartty (2008), we have found their examples excluding those
from engineering sciences, and this greatly attracts our attention. Might this idiosyncrasy
lead people to suspect that examples considered by Stanford form an unrepresentative sam-
ple or that there is something about the characteristic of engineering sciences that renders
them especially immune to PUA?
Let us now revisit the motivating example of Newtonian mechanics mentioned by Stan-
ford (2006) and consider the science of sending rockets. As mentioned by Stanford (2006),
Newtonian mechanics is still the physics we use to send rockets to the moon, because it is
much simpler to work with than the contemporary alternatives and the empirical predic-
tions it makes at the scale of rockets and moons turn out to be quite accurate despite the
fact that it is profoundly mistaken about the fundamental constitution of nature. Does this
mean that rocket science is immune to Stanford’s induction because the range of operation
is quite accurate to use Newtonian mechanics to make empirical predictions? Also men-
tioned by Stanford, that PUA might work for virtually every scientific field. If so, what is
the PUA for rocket science? This line of reasoning would form the main arguments of the
following paragraphs. We would examine several fields of engineering sciences and try to
compare their situations with rocket science and Newtonian mechanics, and also we try to
see if there is a PUA in each of these engineering disciplines.
To find the reasons why engineering sciences are excluded from Stanford’s induction,
one simple answer might be engineering sciences rarely touch the philosophical founda-
tions of sciences, and thus they are immune to the concerns of the debates. But this
only scratches the surface of a serious question. Engineering sciences systematically apply
theories developed by fundamental sciences to a wide variety of fields, and we see how
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examples of applied sciences enrich and extend fundamental sciences. Shockley, Bardeen,
and Brattain invented the junction transistors in the middle of twentieth century, and their
invention was initially conceived as achievements of engineers. But this invention initiated
active research in material physics and condensed matter physics, and led to better under-
standing of many useful electronic materials with wide range of applications. If Stanford’s
induction could apply to the foundations of atomic science, namely, the interpretation of
electrons and atoms, could we say the theories adopted by microelectronics researchers are
quite accurate in the range of operation presently concerned but are profoundly mistaken
about the fundamental constitution of nature? Is there a PUA in microelectronics research
community?
For microelectronics research, the situation is relatively similar to that of rocket science
and Newtonian mechanics. When it is sufficient not to use advanced quantum mechanics
or quantum field theory, semi-classical electron theory is used to make empirical predic-
tions on the behavior of microelectronic materials. In this regard, the theory makes quite
accurate prediction in the scale concerned but is fundamentally mistaken about the con-
stitution of nature. The PUA introduced by advanced quantum mechanics and quantum
theory are certainly not in the range of interest. Although models and theories made on
new microelectronic materials could be flawed, the range of operation and the successful
prediction offered by semi-classical electron theory seems to provide some stability. A PUA
might exist for microelectronic research community, but the historical induction part of the
PUA proposed by Stanford (2006) should be re-examined as the history of microelectronics
are unlike the history of physical sciences.
Let us now move to another field of engineering sciences built upon microelectronics.
Kilby and Noyce invented integrated circuits in 1960s, and this led to mass production of
small, stable, and cheap integrated circuits for digital computers. Henssey and Patterson
invented the Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) to make better use of these inte-
grated circuits for high-performance computers, and this led to active research in computer
architecture from 1980s until today. Microelectronics forms the foundations of computer
architecture, and researchers closely observe the advance of microelectronics. If Stanford’s
induction could apply to the foundations of microelectronics, it would certainly be worri-
some for computer architecture researchers. However, this problem has not been widely
recognized by the computer architecture research community. Could we find a PUA in
computer architecture research community?
For computer architecture research, the situation is different from that of rocket science
and Newtonian mechanics. Computer architecture research community does not rely on
basic theory developed by physical sciences. Instead, computer architecture research com-
munity relies on quantitative performance measurements and proven design principles not
directly related to the constitution of nature. We could not find much similarity between
this engineering discipline and the examples discussed by Stanford (2006). A PUA might
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exist for computer architecture research community, but the historical induction part of
the PUA proposed by Stanford (2006) should be re-examined as the history of computer
architecture is drastically different from the history of physical sciences.
Let us now move to another field of engineering sciences built upon computer architec-
ture. The advance of computer architecture greatly increased the speed of computation
and presented challenges to the security of information as computers could be used as
code-breaking devices. Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman proposed the RSA public-key cryp-
tography algorithms in 1978 to produce information protection scheme that is computa-
tionally hard to break with today’s most advanced computers. The advance of computer
architecture plays a critical role for information security, and researchers closely observe
the development of the most advanced computers. If Stanford’s induction could apply to
the foundations of computer architecture, it would certainly be worrying for information
security researchers. And indeed this problem has been widely recognized by information
security research community as the post-quantum cryptography and is expected to revo-
lutionize the state-of-the-art cryptography. Does quantum computing resemble a PUA in
information security?
For information security research, the situation is not the same as that of rocket science
and Newtonian mechanics. Information security research relies on mathematical formulae
and computational models not directly related to the constitution of nature. However, some
assumptions of the models are related to the laws of physics. For instance, it is widely know
that some information security researchers perform research based on the assumption that
quantum computers would not be realized in short time; other researchers perform research
on the crypto-systems assuming quantum computers would become a reality. Could we say
quantum computing is a PUA for information security research? We believe not in the
same sense given by Stanford. Since the problem with present crypto-system dealing with
quantum computing has already been conceived long before the realization of quantum
computers. This historical trajectory is somewhat different from the cases given by Stan-
ford’s induction. A PUA might exist for information security research community, but the
historical induction part of the PUA proposed by Stanford (2006) should be re-examined
as the history of information security is distinctive from the history of physical sciences.
The issue that no sufficient data could support Stanford’s induction applying to the
afore-mentioned engineering sciences could not be satisfactorily explained by the link of
these sciences to the foundations of physical sciences. We argue that the distinctive history
of these engineering sciences is the key to the immunity of engineering sciences in face of
Stanford’s induction. For microelectronics, the existence of many unknown materials leads
researchers to explore their properties with existing theories. For computer architecture,
the existence of manufacturing obstacles such as the purity of substrates, the precision
of lithography increases the confidence of researchers that the solutions to these technical
challenges would lead to the advance of the field. For information security, the assumption
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of the upper bound of the growth rate of computing power gives researchers confidence
intervals to do meaningful research with existing methods in the foreseeable future. Each
of these historical trajectories is itself distinct and requires careful analysis in order to per-
form meaningful history induction such as PUA.
Motivated by the afore-mentioned examples, we classify engineering sciences in two cat-
egories: first, fields that are in similar situation as rocket science and Newtonian mechanics
(e.g. microelectronics); second, fields that are in different situation from that of rocket
science and Newtonian mechanics (e.g. computer architecture, information security). In
both categories, Stanford’s induction could not directly apply to the cases of interests. For
example, in the case of microelectronics, we understand the PUA of electrons and atoms
and its historical induction, but we have not found much similarity in the development of
semiconductors, metals, and magnetic materials including their functional properties; in
the case of computer architecture, we do not even have a direct link to the theory of phys-
ical sciences, but we have quantitative performance measurements and design principles
related to the products of physical sciences; in the case of information security, we have
computation models based on the assumptions related to the physical sciences, but it is
conceived and well understood long before the realization of the evidence (i.e. quantum
computers). The history of the first category might be closer to the history of physical
sciences, whereas the history of the second category might be far different from that of
physical sciences.
Let us now investigate further. If possible, what might the historical induction part of
the PUA for these engineering sciences look like? Although arguably justifiable, we might
induct on the number of electronic materials engineers failed to analyse with existing theo-
ries, we might induct on the number of microprocessors failing to function as expected, we
might induct on the number of years when the growth rate of computing speed exceed ex-
pectation. In other words, we might make historical induction on the inability of engineers
in order to form PUA arguments for these engineering sciences. The reasons why such
inductions are hard to make might be: first, they are difficult to organize – the number of
electronic materials engineers failed to analyse is time-varying, and not entirely related to
the theories; second, they are not very meaningful – the number of microprocessors that
fail to function is not well-controlled and is related to manufacturing yield rate; third, they
do not exist yet – the growth rate of computer speed roughly doubles every two years for
the past twenty years and is known as the Moore’s law. Most importantly, the induction
would be field-dependent due to the distinctive nature of each of these engineering disci-
plines. General remarks are not easily drawn. Also note that many engineering sciences are
still young compared to the physical sciences, therefore the power of historical induction is
diminished.
To coin a phrase, the reason why the stability of engineering sciences are not shaken by
Stanford’s induction is because the historical induction part of PUA cannot directly apply
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to engineering sciences with diverse historical trajectories drastically different from that of
physical sciences. We believe PUA arguments could be formulated for virtually every sci-
entific field as Stanford claimed. But this would require careful examination of the history
of the engineering field of interests. This way, we might be able to teach engineers some-
thing about the reasonableness of their methods, and the effectiveness of their techniques.
Caution is needed before doing historical induction because the historical trajectories of
some engineering sciences are short compared to the physical sciences, and they are also
more diversified. It is still an open question whether induction here can draw any powerful
arguments such as those for the physical sciences.
We hope the nature of the immunity of engineering sciences to Stanford’s induction is
now clear. It is because the historical induction part of PUA cannot be applied to the
diverse and radically different historical trajectories of many engineering fields. However,
while finding many examples of engineering studies that corroborate the immunity of en-
gineering sciences to Stanford’s induction is possible, it does not preclude the possibility
of the existence of instances of engineering fields that exhibit the historical induction part
of PUA proposed by Stanford. It might be hard to find all of such unusual cases, but
giving an interesting case that exhibits such concerns might further clarify the essence of
engineering sciences. In the following sections, we present an interesting case in mechanical
engineering: the d’Alembert’s paradox.
3 D’Alembert’s paradox
The d’Alembert’s paradox, encountered when studying fluid mechanics, is today well known
by engineers, and is one of the most particular behavior studying in fluid mechanics. This
paradox was first brought to light by Leonhard Euler in 1745 and Jean-Charles Borda in
1766, but it was Jean le Rond d’Alembert who really defined it as a paradox in 1768. The
point of this paper is not to describe the historical evolution or study the physical mecha-
nism of the paradox, but rather to give the main idea and insert it in our discussion about
Stanford’s induction. The d’Alembert’s paradox claims that, in the case of a symmetric
body surrounding by an ideal fluid and an incompressible flow, the drag, that is the force
the fluid exerts on the body, vanishes. It means that the fluid exerts no forces on the body
and the latter does not ”feel” the presence of the fluid, hence the paradox. Indeed, it is
a contradiction between the theoretical prediction (the calculation of the drag) and what
we observe in experiment, that is, that all bodies placed in a moving fluid is subject to the
actions of the fluid. D’Alembert concluded in ”opuscules mathe´matiques” (1768): Thus I
do not see, I admit, how one can satisfactorily explain by theory the resistance of fluids.
On the contrary, it seems to me that the theory, developed in all possible rigor, gives, at
least in several cases, a strictly vanishing resistance; a singular paradox which I leave to
future Geometers to elucidate. It was only in the XIXth century that Barre´ de Saint-Venant
resolved the paradox by considering a real fluid, that is a fluid in which viscosity is taken
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into account, rather than an ideal fluid.
Let us emphasize the notion of ideal fluid, for we will use it latter. The concept of ideal
fluid is to consider a fluid devoid of any viscosity, that is a fluid in which all the shear forces
between molecules can be neglected. To illustrate the notion of viscosity, we can take the
example of the spin motion of a spoon in water and honey. In water, the motion is much
more easy to achieve than in honey and this is due to viscosity. At d’Alembert’s time, the
notion of viscosity was not understood in terms of the previous definition (concerning a
microscopic scale), but rather it was understood in terms of the notion of tenaciousness,
that is the capability of a fluid to resist motion.
One might be wondering now, how this paradox could take part in our philosophical
analysis about the debate of scientific realism since the theoretical prediction was never
believed to be true. The answer is found in the next section where we analyze the philo-
sophical aspect of the paradox and try to understand how we can use it to discuss Stanford’s
induction.
4 Philosophical analysis of the d’Alembert’s paradox
4.1 Stable or unstable ?
As mentioned before, engineering sciences can be divided in two categories, one containing
stable theories, like rocket science and newtonian mechanics, and one typified by unstable
theories. D’Alembert’s paradox is clearly, at a first glance, a separation between two
theories, or more precisely, two different ways of considering fluid dynamics problems in
general. It is a separation between the theory of inviscid fluids (TIF), which turns out to
lack an accurate description of fluid motion in certain cases, and the theory of real fluids
(TRF), which allows us to comprehend and describe fluid flow when the former theory
cannot. In that sense, d’Alembert’s paradox belongs to the unstable part of engineering
science, since it spells out the end of an apparently old false theory (TIF). We will see
later the justification of use of the term ”apparently”. Let us clarify these two theories
and see how it actually turns out that the first theory is still used nowadays and therefore
it is not so clear that the paradox belongs to the unstable part in every case. Indeed, we
will see that TIF is not a completely false theory. Moreover, let us analyze the paradox in
the philosophical point of view in more details and try to answer the question whether it
refutes Stanford’s induction or not.
4.2 D’Alembert’s paradox and Stanford’s pessimism
At d’Alembert’s time, people only considered fluid as ideal and it is in this context that the
paradox arose. In order to calculate the drag the fluid exerts upon the body, d’Alembert
used the previous work done by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 in which he describes properties
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of ideal fluids. D’Alembert ended up with a zero drag leaving him perplexed. Hence, this
paradox could be construed to cast doubt upon the work of Bernoulli in general, and more
specifically upon the concept of ideal fluid until the latter work of Saint-Venant, in which
the paradox is resolved by considering a real fluid rather than an ideal one. However, in the
period of time between d’Alembert and Saint-Venant, people still believed in and applied
the accepted model of that time, namely the ideal fluid model, and this is the reason why
we can insert d’Alembert’s paradox in our discussion about Stanford’s induction.
In the following section, we try to find some arguments that could support Stanford’s
induction before giving arguments against it in section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Stanford’s induction: pro-arguments
Stanford’s induction is based on the problem of unconceived alternatives (section 2).
Chakravartty (2008) demonstrates that PUA ”is a version of UTE plus a historical in-
duction, leading to a sceptical conclusion about scientific knowledge”. To support PUA,
one could try to give arguments supporting both UTE and PI components. However, in
our case, we focus only on the second component of PUA (PI) rather than the first one
(UTE).
Following the PI thesis, there are in the history of science, theories that were believed to
be true but then turned out to be false. It is the case for example for the caloric theory of
heat, the electromagnetic aether or the optical aether as Laudan (1981) describes. Works
done by philosophers deal in most cases about physics examples because it is probably the
field of science which is the most shaken by wrong theories. However, we can also find
examples in the history of engineering science and in particular is the case of the ”sound
barrier”. Indeed, in the XXth century when aerodynamics encountered a real expansion,
aerodynamicists thought that no air plane, both at that time and even in the future, could
overcome the so-called ”sound barrier”. However, it turned out later that air planes could
cross this ”barrier” and it is well known by today’s engineers that the ”sound barrier”
is actually a myth. Hence, there are examples that show that engineering science is not
immuned to theories that were believed to be true but subsequently turned out to be false.
Concerning d’Alembert’s paradox, it constitutes an example supporting PI’s argument
about transition from older theories toward newer ones. Indeed, theory of ideal fluids is
clearly questioned by d’Alembert’s paradox and is one of the occupants of the graveyard
of false theories that were believed to be true but subsequently — due to the paradox —
turned out to be false that Chakravartty (2008) describes. Indeed, if one takes a look retro-
spectively at d’Alembert’s time, fluid mechanics was known mainly through the trustworthy
works of Bernoulli describing the behaviour of ideal fluids. But because of the paradox,
TIF seemed to encounter a real limit to its validity. Mechanisists at that time, despite the
disturbance due to the paradox, still continued to believe in TIF because they did not have
anything better to rely on, and because they were unable to conceive of other alternatives
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Figure 1: Ideal fluid
Figure 2: Real fluid
that could have allowed an answer to the paradox. To insist on this inability in developing
an alternative, we can utilize the fact that, almost one century latter the discovery of the
paradox, scientists were lead to conceive of TRF in the description of a fluid flow, serving
St-Venant in resolving the paradox. The ”discovery” of this new theory therefore supports
the ”conspicuous absence of theories that are consistent with or as equally well-confirmed as
those believed, but that are subsequently conceived and adopted” that Stanford (2006) claims.
Another example, emphasizing the fact that the history of scientific theories is typified,
even in engineering science, by a translation from older theories to newer ones, is the case
of a flow over a wing, appearing again in aerodynamics. Consider the flow over the body
shown in figure 1. In the case of using TIF to describe this flow, one will end up with the
streamlines shown in figure 1, where streamlines in direct contact with the body slip over
its surface. In the case of TRF description, the presence of frictional shear stress in the
flow (viscosity) induce both non-slip of streamlines on the surface and the apparition of a
separated region in which the flow recirculates (figure 2). In real life, all engineers know
that the flow over a wing behaves as described in the second case — because TIF is an
idealization — and if one wants to use TIF, one will miss this separated flow behind the
wing and will end up with a wrong result. Thus, in this description of the flow over a wing,
engineers have to abandon TIF in favor of TRF, leading to a transition from an old theory
(TIF) to a new one (TRF).
From the previous analysis of PI applied to engineering science and following the pes-
simistic conclusion, current theories will be replaced and regarded as false from some future
perspective. Stanford would add some arguments dealing with theorists rather than the-
ories and claim that since scientists at d’Alembert’s time were faced with PUA, today’s
scientists will probably be faced with the same problem. It would means that TRF is prob-
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ably false, pending some improvements or even a new theory. This argument is somewhat
quite disturbing considering the huge amount of theoritical predictions and experiments
based on TRF that turn out to be verified in the real word (airplanes can fly because it is
well understood thanks to TRF). This leads us to the next point in which we try to defuse
Stanford’s pessimism.
4.2.2 No place for Stanford’s induction
Stanford’s arguments about PUA and the new induction (NI) can be refuted using three
main points (Egg, forthcoming): two concerning PUA and one concerning the induction.
About the unconceived alternatives, they have the property, under certain conditions on
continuity of science that we will discuss latter on, to be not radically distinct from theories
that were conceived by scientists. Therefore PUA is no longer a threat to realism, because
even though there are alternatives, although unconceived, they are similar to the theory
at hand. In other words, it means that the conceived theories are similar enough to the
theory one already has, and therefore there is no reason anymore to doubt that the theory
at hand is at least partially true. For instance, concerning our discussion on engineering
science, TRF differs from TIF only through viscosity. Moreover, Stanford (2006) argues
that ”realist can only retrospectively identify those parts or aspects of earlier theories that
were retained in later theories”. In other words, one can identify the trustworthy parts of
a theory because one has been able to make the distinction, only after knowing the new
theory, between the false theory and the new one. However, let us lean on Psillos’ (2009)
argument and say that the ability to identify the trustworthy parts of a theory does not
depend on the fact that we know, in retrospect, which parts of a theory are retained. In-
deed, as we will see below in the continuity arguments, fluid mechanics equations are the
trustworthy parts of TIF that scientists were able to identify. In particular, we can take the
example of Bernoulli’s equations that were retained across the change of direction. But it
does not depend on knowing that these equations are retained in TRF, but rather because
of their empirical success.
The second point for unconceived alternatives, based on Magnus arguments, deals with
the plausibility of these alternatives. According to Magnus, the plausibility of unconceived
alternatives depends on the historical context in which we consider the scientific theo-
ries. Indeed, TRF seems nowadays a plausible theory that engineering science community
could not avoid to describe fluids phenomena, but it is not certain that mechanisists at
d’Alembert’s time would have found TRF plausible. Stanford (2006, sec 1.2) also makes a
distinction between mere skeptical fantasies and scientifically serious alternatives that we
have to take into account in the identification process. However, this argument can be re-
futed as follows: it seems today really implausible to us that the knowledge that engineers
have about real fluid would be completely wrong and replaced by a brand new concept of
fluid. But if someone in the future can actually discover that the way today’s engineers de-
scribe fluid does not refer to the truth, then we would have to conclude that this brand new
scenario was actually a serious alternative that we should have kept in mind. According to
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Magnus, ”if we must now take seriously what we might ultimately have to take seriously in
the future, then we have to take all skeptical possibilities seriously”. (Magnus 2010).
The last of the three points mentioned before, is the one dealing with the induction. As
we already saw, Stanford claims that since theorists in the past were unable to conceive of
other alternatives to false theories, and based on the assumption that present scientists are
not radically different from past theorists, then by an induction argument, today’s scien-
tists will also fail to conceive of alternatives. One way to counteract this assumption is to
say precisely that theories as well as theorists differ from past ones due to improvements
in scientific methodology that Devitt (2011) asserts. As an illustrative example, we can
refer to as the boundary layer theory that appeared during the expansion of aerodynamics
in the XXth century. The boundary layer is, in a nutshell, a very thin region of a flow in
which shear stresses are predominant in comparison to the rest of the flow. Before knowing
the boundary layer concept, scientists in the past did not take it into account. But this
concept created a real breakthrough in aerodynamic analysis, and today, engineers can not
ignore this thin region in the methodology to solve problems.
Let us go further in our analysis. Except for few theories like the example concerning
the ”sound barrier” given previously, mechanical engineering seems very stable and theories
established seem to be true and stay true along time. Even in the ideal / real fluids discus-
sion questioned by d’Alembert’s paradox, the stability is ensured since many of engineering
applications use ideal fluids theory even now (we now understand the sense of ”apparently”
false theory in section 4.1). This is justify by the fact that, in certain cases, ideal fluids the-
ory can bring a good description of flows, and engineers do not have to appeal to real fluids
theory. In comparison to physics, there are no drastic changes in theories or in directions
to describe world’s phenomena, such as the electromagnetic aether theory that turned out
to be false and replaced by Maxwell’s theory latter on. The changes in the electromagnetic
aether theory is more drastic than in TIF because, in the case of the former one, it is a
false theory, whereas the latter one is partially false, in the sense that engineers are still
using the equations of TIF but they no longer believe in the underlying hypothesis. Much
more convincing is to say that light is a more complex physical aspect of the world than
fluids. Indeed, light is a composition of many unobservable entities, like electrons, protons,
quarks, and if one wants to study properties of light, one has no direct access, so that it is
much more difficult to understand its properties. Therefore, physicists have to demonstrate
a real ability in creating theories to try to understand the real entities and properties of
light. Due to this, they are more often exposed as incorrect than those theories involved
in mechanical engineering. By contrast, even if fluids are made of molecules and atoms
that involve the above-mentioned entities, one do not need, in engineering applications, to
describe fluids at a microscopic level; it is sufficient to describe it at a mesoscopic level
(scale between microscopic and macroscopic scale), so that it is less challenging than in
physics to build a theory, and thus the theory is more immune to wrong stances. One
might ask then — besides the fact that the aether concept is false — why engineers are still
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using TIF whereas physicists are not using the aether any more. As a potential answer,
we can assert that the theoretical predictions using TIF has been extensively verified by
the experience in laboratories. By contrast, the luminiferous aether has never been typified.
Therefore, the PI component is difficult to admit in our discussion and, as a conse-
quence, makes PUA without strengths.
Let us now emphasize the last point allowing mechanical engineering to survive Stan-
ford’s pessimism. As Chakravartty supports, realists can appeal to the principled continuity
across theory changes, in order to identify which parts of theories will likely be retained
in the future. The identification, according to him, has to be based on causal knowledge,
a promising criterion ”that allows one to manipulate it” (the causal knowledge) ”in highly
systematic ways” (2008). However, he highlights the fact that Stanford, among others,
misidentify these trustworthy parts of theories because their identification are based on
realism taken at the level of entities, and Chakravartty claims that one has to consider re-
alism rather at the level of properties because it is these properties that will survive through
changes in theories. What is new in Chakravartty argument, is that, in the identification
process, one does not need to refer to entities, but only to well-confirmed properties. For
instance, equations describing fluid flows are retained across the turnover from TIF to TRF,
and the reason is because causal properties survive from old to new theory even though
we do not speak about the same entities. Indeed, one major property that we can identify
in fluid mechanics, which has not seen any resistance through history of mechanics, is the
conservation of mass, property that one can use without referring to as fluid particle entity.
To borrow one of Chakravartty’s example (2008), physicists all agree on the property of
negative charge that an electron possesses, but we can not say that all physicists believe
in the existence of electrons. In the same way, do TIF and TRF, both in agreement with
the fluid particle entity, end up with the same result to describe how fluids flow ? The
answer is of course no. But do TIF and TRF endorse the property of compressibility or
incompressibility of fluid particle ? Yes they do. One might now ask why it is such a case.
In fact, the property of compressibility or not of a fluid is related to the conservation of
mass mentioned above. Compressible or not, fluid mass is always conserved, that the fluid
being real or considered as ideal.
We could give other examples, like the rotational or the potential properties, but let us
investigate further.
Chakravartty claims (2008) that once one owns this causal knowledge argument, one
can rescue some other insights from Stanford’s pessimism. For instance, structural realists
can in fact lean on the argument that through changes of theories across time, there are
mathematical structures that can be preserved. Chakravartty defines the term ”structure”
as being the relationships between properties and he identifies them as mathematical equa-
tions. For instance, if we take one of Bernoulli’s result concerning the total energy in a fluid,
it says that the irrotational flow of a fluid in which the density is constant is homoenergetic,
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that is, the energy is constant as the flow takes place. This can be translated to a simple
equation which makes the link, in particular, between the property of no-swirling (irro-
tational property) and incompressibility (constant density property) of the fluid particle.
This relationship therefore ensures the survival of the properties to Stanford’s induction.
Still on the process of analyzing the continuity through changes of theories, let us try
to identify which parts of TIF survived Stanford’s skepticism. D’Alembert’s paradox is
indeed a strong argument against TIF and was a real challenge for scientists for nearly a
century. However, even when the paradox was fully understood by Saint-Venant, chang-
ing the way fluid flows are described, the previous work done by Bernoulli still remained
even though the paradox could tend to cast doubt on it (as an example is the one given
above concerning the conservation of energy). And a strong proof, is the expansive use of
Bernoulli’s equations in fluid mechanics even today. More importantly, fluid mechanics is
built on three main principles that could not be shaken by Stanford’s pessimism. Indeed,
TIF predicted a zero drag for the force a fluid exerts on a body, whereas TRF would have
predicted a completely different result (which is, by the way, the real result verified ex-
perimentally). But through the turnover from TIF to TRF, there are three mathematical
equations associated with these three principles that both TIF and TRF endorse. These
equations involve properties of fluids, and especially, properties of fluid particles, that can
be systematically manipulated in order to ensure the survival of the relationship between
these properties. Conversation of fluid mass, fluid momentum and fluid energy are these
properties. Therefore, engineers can lean on these properties, allowing them to have a
promising criterion which can be used to withstand a prospective future disturbance of
theories in mechanical engineering.
Let us summarize what we have argued so far against Stanford’s pessimism. The first
point that one can use is what Egg (forthcoming) calls the ”distinctness of unconceived
alternatives”: alternatives to a theory, though unconceived, are not radically different from
the theory at hand. TIF and TRF differ only because of the consideration of viscosity
in the second case. Moreover, we have emphasized the fact that our ability to identify
which parts of past theories that were likely to be retained, is not based on retrospect and
does not depend on knowing that they were retained in latter theories. Indeed, the fact
that Bernoulli’s work is retained across the change of theory, is not because one knows, in
retrospect, that they are retained in the new theory, but rather because of their empirical
sucess. Then we have argued, based on Magnus’ arguments (2006), about the plausibility
of the unconceived alternatives and said that PUA is actually context-dependent. It does
not mean that TRF is today plausible for engineers, that it would have been plausible for
scientists at d’Alembert’s time. Another argument we have used to counteract Stanford’s
pessimism is the difference between past and present scientists due to improvements of
scientific methodologies along time. Today’s engineers do not have the same approach and
methodology in resolving a problem than that engineers had at d’Alembert’s time. The last
very important point we have granted, is the principled continuity across scientific theories
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over time. One can have a promising criterion if one is able to start the identification process
based on causal knowledge. Causal knowledge can be identified by mathematical structures
which are in our case the fluid mechanics equations. Furthermore, the identification has to
be performed at the level of well-confirmed properties rather than at the level of entities.
5 Conclusions
Recent works in scientific realism by Stanford (2006) and Chakravartty (2008) have gener-
ated interests in the research of a more selective and sophisticated realism. Among many
scientific theories discussed by Stanford (2006) and Chakravartty (2008), we have found
their examples excluding those from engineering sciences, and this greatly attracts our
attention. We are particularly interested in finding something about the characteristic of
engineering sciences that renders them especially immune to PUA.
Historical induction offers a power tool to challenge scientific realism. From PI to PUA,
anti-realists have found powerful and appealing arguments based on historical induction.
Thus the validity of historical induction places a central role in applying anti-realism ar-
guments. In this paper, we focus on the validity of applying the historical induction part
of PUA to several engineering sciences and find that this historical induction is generally
speaking not directly applicable to engineering sciences.
The reason why the stability of engineering sciences are not shaken by Stanford’s induc-
tion is because the historical induction part of PUA cannot directly apply to engineering
sciences with diverse historical trajectories drastically different from that of the physical
sciences. We believe PUA arguments could be formulated for virtually every scientific field
as Stanford said. But this would require careful examination of the history of the engineer-
ing field of interests. This way, we might be able to teach engineers something about the
reasonableness of their methods, and the effectiveness of their techniques. Cautions are
needed before doing historical induction because the historical trajectories of some engi-
neering sciences are short compared to physical sciences, and they are also more diversified.
It is still an open question whether induction here can draw any powerful arguments as
those for physical sciences.
PI is for sure difficult to apply because of the reasons given above. However, it seems
that PI could find its place in the case of the d’Alembert’s paradox. Indeed, the latter
spells out the end of an apparently false theory in favour of a new one and increase the size
of the graveyard of theories that were believed to be true but then turned out to be false
that we find in history of science. Hence, as it is say above, PUA can again be applied in
the case of the paradox because scientists were not able to conceive of alternatives.
However, though unconceived, these alternatives are not written in stone and are
context-dependent and one has to examine in which historical context scientists were un-
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able to conceive of alternatives. If PUA is plausible, in the sense of the historical context,
then one has to take all possibilities, even apparently fanciful, as a serious alternative.
What is more challenging for Stanford’s pessimism, is that realism in engineering science
is regarded at the level of properties rather than entities. And here is the great example
of fluid mechanics equations translating relations between properties without referring to
entities that possess these properties, and leads to the major point allowing one to argue
with Stanford’s pessimism, which is the principled continuity. It can actually be applied to
engineering science, and engineers have causal knowledge that allows them to manipulate
it in systematic ways, namely mathematical structures describing these relations between
properties.
Hence, given that many stable examples, for instance microelectronics, computer ar-
chitecture or information security, though belonging to different categories of sciences, the
PUA argument remains applicable to each field, but its historical induction is much more
difficult to apply because of the varying diversity and differences of historical backgrounds
of engineering science. Furthermore, the seemly unstable example of d’Alembert’s paradox
could tend to make one believe that Stanford’s induction has its place even in engineering
science, but as it turned out, thanks to the existence of causal knowledge engineers pos-
sess, the stability is preserved. Therefore, we have reasons to believe, undergirded by the
argument of the stability and causal knowledge of engineering science, that we can refute
Stanford’s induction in engineering sciences.
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